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I.

INTRODUCTION

Oceana, West Virginia, is a small town in Wyoming County situated
within the Appalachian coal fields. Oceana was once a prosperous and
welcoming town but today, the town and surrounding areas are trying to cope
with the lingering effects and impacts of the opioid epidemic. Oceana has a
population of only 1,280 people and a median household income of $27,216.1
The impact of opioids has affected economic indicators within the town and
county. Between 2014 and 2015, Oceana's population decreased by more than
19% and median household income declined by more than 10%.2 The impact of
opioid addiction in Oceana is so extensive that many children are noticing
changes within the community; but for some, the impact of opioid addiction is
all they have ever known.3
A high school student, Chelsea, recalls that a drug problem has been
present within Oceana for years, as early as 2011.4 In addition to her coal mining
community, opioids have affected Chelsea's entire family. 5 She notes that her
6
father, who was injured in a coal mining accident, became addicted to opioids.
His addiction led to the divorce of her parents and the separation of her family. 7
Another student at Oceana Middle School says that her parents talk about how
hospitable Oceana used to be but now is unsafe due to the ongoing drug
problems.8 In fact, she states that it is so dangerous that no one should be outside

I

Oceana, WV,DATA USA, https://datausa.io/profile/geo/oceana-wv/#economy (last visited

Oct. 14, 2018).
2
Id.
3
See generallyAddiction Affects Everyone, Effects of Opioids on Communities and What Can
be
Done,
PBS
(Jan.
17,
2018)
[hereinafter
Addiction
Affects
Everyone],
http ://www.pbs.org/wned/opioid-epidemic/for-educators/effects-opioids-communities-and-what-

can-be-done/ (depicting interviews of Oceana Middle School students by Senator Joe Manchin
regarding the effects of opioids within their community and the impacts of opioids on their lives).
4
See id.
5
6
7
8

Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
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alone, not even in the daytime. 9 Another student conveyed her story to Senator
Joe Manchin when he visited the middle school to speak about Oceana's drug
problem. 0 Her family was torn apart when she was only five years old, after her
stepfather murdered her mother by injecting her with OxyContin and then took
his own life."
The stories conveyed by these students about their community in West
Virginia illustrate many problems that many communities are currently facing.
The opioid epidemic is wreaking havoc throughout the country and imposing
2
economic hardships on many local governments. Oceana's statistics regarding
decreased population and income, coupled with an increased crime rate, illustrate
just some of the hardships imposed by opioid addiction. As a result, many local
governments have filed public nuisance lawsuits against opioid distributors for3
flooding the state with opioids and creating misrepresentations in marketing.'
The local governments rest their claims on past public nuisance suits that have
sought to hold manufacturers of guns, lead paint, and tobacco liable for effects
on public health. Courts in these cases have declined to expand the traditional
doctrine of public nuisance into the world of products liability. However, these,
failures have not stopped governments in West Virginia from seeking damages
based on public nuisance.
While these stories derive from a small West Virginia community, the
Mountain State is not alone in fighting the damaging impacts of opioid addiction.
Governments within West Virginia and other states claim that opioid distributors
have created a public nuisance for which they are entitled to abate. States
throughout the country are searching for tools to regulate the predatory practices
of opioid distributors and provide relief to opioid addicted populations. Because
public nuisance allows recovery of equitable remedies and legal damages in
certain circumstances, many governments have filed complaints against opioid
distributors for violations of public nuisance law. 14

9

Id.

10

See id.

I

Id.

While West Virginia is also attempting to cope with increased overdoses of residents and
economic expenses tied to heroin, this is outside the scope of this paper; however, it is
acknowledged that the heroin epidemic likely resulted from the rise in costs of opioids. Heroin is
easier to obtain due to the fact that it is relatively inexpensive and, unlike prescription opioids, is
not regulated by the pharmaceutical and health care industry. Although West Virginia and other
states are burdened by abuse of this drug, this paper focuses on the effects of opioids on the public
health of individuals and communities as a result of drug marketing and distribution tactics.
12

13
Scott Higham & Lenny Bernstein, Opioid DistributorsSued by West Virginia Counties Hit
by Drug Crisis, WASH. POST (Mar. 9, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/healthscience/lawsuits-filed-against-drug-distributors-in-west-virginia/201 7/03/09/f9e3165e-050 111 e7-b 1e9-a05d3c21 f7cf story.html?utmterm=.de902d3 c07 18.
14
See Jamie Satterfield, TN Attorney General: FDA Approved OxyContin Labels, Not
9:55 AM),
2018,
(Aug. 23,
OxyContin Maker's 'Deception', KNOX NEWS
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This paper acknowledges that although these governments need
resources to restore their communities, they have failed to state a valid claim for
public nuisance. The governments have failed to allege a violation of a legitimate
public right but are instead suing based upon public interests. The acts of doctors,
patients, and others obscure the causal chain and make causation a difficult
element to establish. Further, even if the local governments succeed in their
claims for public nuisance, the tort is inadequate in providing the remedies that
these governments seek. Governments throughout the United States require
capital to rebuild their communities, but there is no oversight or structure in place
to ensure local governments spend these resources in an effective manner. It is
the role of the legislature to provide remedies for these harms and not the courts.
The opioid epidemic wreaks havoc on many communities throughout the country
but expanding the doctrine of public nuisance is hardly an adequate solution to
this complex problem.
This paper examines the tort of public nuisance and applies the tort to
recent suits filed against opioid distributors. First, Part II of this paper provides
an overview of the opioid epidemic and its economic impacts on local
governments and municipalities. Part Ill of this paper explores the common law
doctrine of public nuisance and establishes the elements of the tort. Part Ill also
provides modern examples of current public nuisance lawsuits filed in West
Virginia against opioid distributors. Next, Part IV actively applies the doctrine
of public nuisance to these lawsuits to better illustrate why local government
lawsuits against opioid distributors should fail, including intervention by thirdparty actors, lack of causation, and remoteness of damages. Part V then
demonstrates why public nuisance law should not be expanded to serve as an
overbroad remedy to the opioid epidemic and recommends regulatory actions as
a better solution to ongoing problems facing local governments. Finally, Part VI
of this paper concludes by explaining that the expansion of public nuisance law
is unprecedented and would create more problems than many local governments
hope it would solve.

https://www.knoxnews.com/story/news/crime/2018/08/23/tennessee-opioid-lawsuit-ag-fdaapproved-opioid-labels-not-purdue-pharmas-lies/1068786002/ (describing lawsuits filed against
Purdue Pharmaceuticals by the state of Tennessee); Tom Rivers, County DeclaresOpioidEpidemic
a 'PublicNuisance' to Help Recover Costs to Taxpayers, ORLEANS HUB (Mar. 5, 2018, 1:47 PM)

https://orleanshub. com/county-declares-opioid-epidemic-a-public-nuisance-to-help-recovercosts-to-taxpayers/ (examining actions of the Orleans County Legislature to help the county
recover damages resulting from abuse of prescription opioids); Andrew Harris et al., Justice for
Opioid Communities Means Massive Payday for Their Lawyers,

BLOOMBERG

(July 25, 2018),

https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2018-opioid-lawsuits/ (detailing various types of lawsuits
filed against opioid distributors by states and municipalities to recoup damages as a result of the
opioid epidemic).
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II.

COPING WITH CATASTROPHE: EXPLORING ECONOMIC HARDSHIPS
OF THE OPIOID EPIDEMIC

Local governments are expending financial resources to cope with the
damage inflicted by the opioid epidemic. The opioid epidemic has resulted in a
need for capital to fund rehabilitation programs and other social welfare
programs that will help restore communities to their former capacity. The
damages that these communities have suffered include increased public health
costs, decreased productivity, and job loss. Many local governments claim that
these damages have resulted from the conduct of opioid distributors through the
creation of a public nuisance. Now, local governments have filed suits seeking
damages. This section of this paper will provide an overview of the opioid
epidemic, national economic impacts of the epidemic, and economic hardships
incurred by the State of West Virginia.
A. An Overview of the OpioidEpidemic
The opioid epidemic has not victimized subsets of the United States
population. The vast damages that occur as a result of the opioid epidemic are
not contained to rural settings or to city streets.15 Instead, opioid addiction has
others.1 6
become a national problem that has impacted some states more than
The extensive impact of the opioid epidemic can be attributed to a variety of
factors. First, pharmaceutical companies marketed opioids to physicians as a safe
7
and non-addictive mechanism of treating pain.' At the same time, pressure
mounted in the United States for health care providers to use pain as a vital sign
8
and for those providers to relieve the pain. Lastly, misrepresentations played a
substantial role in the creation of the opioid epidemic through the combination
of the pharmaceutical companies' push to prescribe opioids as a solution to the
physicians' movement to treat pain. 19 These misrepresentations have led to many
deaths, as well as dependency on opioids and heroin.
The statistics related to the opioid epidemic are staggering. In 2014
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention estimate that 53,000
the
alone,
hospitalizations occurred related to opioid abuse while emergency departments

15

Addiction Affects Everyone, supra note 3.

16

Id.

17

The Demandfor Opioids, Effects of Opioids on Communities and What Can Be Done, PBS
http://www.pbs.org/wned/opioid-epidemic/for-educators/effects-opioids17,
2018),

(Jan.

communities-and-what-can-be-done/.
18

See id.

19

See id.
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received an estimated 92,262 visits due to opioid abuse. 20 Further, 15,281 people
died in the United States from drug overdoses of prescription opioids in 2015.21
Drug overdose death rates have increased since the 1990s, with the most dramatic
change occurring between 2013 and 2015.22 During that time frame,
unintentional drug overdose deaths resulting from any opioid increased by
sixteen percent per year.2 3 In 2016, 116 people died everyday related to opioid
overdoses and 948,000 people used heroin.24
B. Plaguingthe Nation-The Costs of the OpioidEpidemic

The numerous deaths and hospitalizations resulting from opioid
addiction inflicts detrimental economic impacts on the United States. In 2013,
the estimated cost of the opioid epidemic in the United States amounted to $78.5
billion. 25 Two years later, in 2015, the country incurred $504 billion in economic
cost as a result of opioid addiction. 26 This cost stems mostly from decreased
productivity in the labor market but also considers increased costs in health care
and the criminal justice system. In 2011, the opioid epidemic accounted for $25
billion in health care costs and $5.1 billion in costs related to the criminal justice
system; 28 however, the largest costs that were generated in relation to the opioid
epidemic occurred in the labor market. 29 The labor market suffered a loss of
$25.6 billion in lost earnings and employment.3 Unfortunately, these statistics
do not occur in isolation and affect other important factors throughout the
economic framework in the United States. In fact, these costs affect more than

20

CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL

RELATED RISKS AND OUTCOMES

&

PREVENTION, ANNUAL SURVEILLANCE REPORT FOR DRUG

17 (2017), https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/pdf/pubs/2017-

cdc-drug-surveillance-report.pdf.
21
Id. at 21.
22
See id. at 23-24.
23

Id.

What Is the U.S. Opioid Epidemic?, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HuM. SERVS.,
https://www.hhs.gov/opioids/about-the-epidemic/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2018).
25
Evelyn Cheng, Goldman Sachs Thinks the Opioid Crisis Is so Bad It's Affecting the
Economy, CNBC (July 6, 2017, 11:00 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/07/06/opioid-crisiskeeping-us-from-reaching- full-employment-goldman.html.
26
Darlene Superville, White House Says Opioid Crisis Cost $504 Billion in 2015, Much
Higher Than Once Thought, PBS NEWS HOUR (Nov. 20, 2017, 2:51 PM),
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/white-house-says-opioid-crisis-cost-504-billion-in-2 15much-higher-than-once-thought.
27
Cheng, supra note 25.
28
Sheelah Kolhatkar, The Cost of the Opioid Crisis, THE NEW YORKER (Sept. 18, 2017),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/09/18/the-cost-of-the-opioid-crisis.
29
Id.
24

30

Id.
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the labor market as they also impact economic variables in everyday life.
According to an interview conducted by the New Yorker, "' [i]f people don't have
jobs, they don't have money to spend in the grocery store, on gasoline. It's the
old multiplier effect: the socioeconomic burden is much broader than on any
individual or any firm."'

31

It is clear that the opioid epidemic is a national problem and has even
32
been declared a public health emergency by the President of the United States.
The opioid epidemic plagues the nation through increased economic costs and
societal costs. 33 Opioid addiction also passes on costs to federal and state welfare

programs for the provision of opioid related services. 34 In 2013, Medicaid
expended $9.4 billion on services for opioid addicted enrollees.3 5 The opioid
epidemic results in expansive health care costs due to health conditions and
public health concerns stemming from the use of opioids.36 The $9.4 billion in
expenditures by Medicaid included treatment for heart conditions, mental illness,
37
asthma, and other conditions associated with opioid usage. The opioid
epidemic resulted in $215 billion in national health care costs since 2001.38 One
study suggests that opioid addiction has cost the United States $1 trillion since
2001 and projects that it could cost the country another $500 billion over the next
three years. 9
C. Economic Impacts on the State of West Virginia
"We are losing a generation of West Virginians to drug abuse, [a]nd...
when it comes to an addicted mother with her newborn baby, I'm worried we're

31

Id.

32

Greg Allen & Amita Kelly, Trump Administration Declares Opioid Crisis a Public Health
AM),
5:02
2017,
26,
(Oct.
NPR

Emergency,

https://www.npr.org/201 7/1 0/26/560083795/president-trump-may-declare-opioid-epidemicnational-emergency.
33

Id.
See generally Katherine Young & Julia Zur, Medicaid and the Opioid Epidemic:
Enrollment, Spending, and the Implications of ProposedPolicy Changes, KAISER FAM. FOUND.
(July 14, 2017), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/medicaid-and-the-opioid-epidemic34

enrollment-spending-and-the-implications-of-proposed-policy-changes/ (explaining the costs of
the opioid epidemic to Medicaid, a federal and state funded social welfare program for health care
costs).
35

Id.

36

See id.

37

Id,

38
Greg Allen, Cost of U.S. Opioid Epidemic Since 2001 Is $1 Trillion and Climbing, NPR
(Feb. 13, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2018/02/13/585199746/costof-u-s-opioid-epidemic-since-2001 -is- I -trillion-and-climbing.
39

Id.
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losing two."4 West Virginia has suffered significant loss due to the opioid
epidemic. As the number of opioid deaths has risen in West Virginia, the state
has been referred to as the "epicenter" of the opioid epidemic.4 1 Many West
Virginians who used opioids became addicted and, as a result of this addiction,
died. Over the last six years, more than 1,500 West Virginians died as a result of
hydrocodone and oxycodone overdoses. 42 Even worse for state and municipal
governments is the aftermath of the opioid epidemic. West Virginia counties are
left with the burden of providing services to an addicted population, comprised
of less productive citizens who need rehabilitation programs and services. West
Virginia and other states are attempting to grapple with the aftermath of an opioid
epidemic that has plagued the nation.
Not only has the opioid epidemic affected the overall health of the state's
population, but the epidemic has also strained an already difficult financial
situation within West Virginia. According to recent statistics, nearly $1 billion
are missing from the West Virginia economy as a result of the opioid epidemic.43
The use of opioids in the state requires resources to be diverted to efforts of
recovery and rehabilitation.' Further, because a large population of West
Virginians are addicted to opioids, the state experienced significant job loss that
resulted in decreased productivity within the state and approximately $194
million that is now absent from the state economy.45
West Virginia's average deaths due to opioid abuse in 2015 drastically
exceeded the national average. In 2015, West Virginia experienced 36 overdose
deaths per 100,000 in population whereas the national average was 10.4 deaths
per 100,000 in population.4 6 Increased deaths lead to a smaller workforce,
increased expenditures, and decreased productivity. 47 Even those West
Virginians who are addicted to opioids have decreased productivity within the

40

John Raby, US Health Secretary Talks About Opioids in West Virginia, U.S. NEWS (May 9,

2017, 6:06 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/west-virginia/articles/2017-05-09/us-

health-secretary-tom-price-visits-west-virginia.
Corky Siemaszko, Attorney General Sessions Heading to West Virginia, Epicenter of U.S.
Epidemic,
NBC
NEWS
(May
11,
2017,
6:10
AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/americas-heroin-epidemic/attomey-genera-sessionsheading-west-virginia-epicenter-u-s-opioid-n75693 1.
42
Kyla Asbury & Chris Dickerson, City of Huntington Sues Drug Wholesalers over Opioid
Epidemic, W. VA. REc. (Jan. 20, 2017), https://wvrecord.com/stories/511075675-city-ofhuntington-sues-drug-wholesalers-over-opioid-epidemic.
43
Brittany Murray, Official Says Opioid Epidemic Shorts State's Economy Nearly $1 Billion,
WV METRO NEWS (Nov. 15, 2017, 1:50 PM), http://wvmetronews.com/2017/11/15/official-saysopioid-epidemic-shorts-states-economy-nearly- -billion/.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
See id.
41

Opioid
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state because they are no longer working, are only working a few hours, or are
less productive per hour of work.48 This has led to approximately 1,200 jobs
49
within the state that have suffered from decreased productivity. This decreased
5°
productivity costs West Virginia about $316 million. The opioid epidemic
places a financial strain on the state as a whole and on local governments within
the state. In fact, the opioid epidemic is "one of the biggest roadblocks to West
Virginia's economic development."5
D. A Litigation Boom: Governments File Suits Seeking Damagesfor
OpioidMisconduct
The persistent addiction and rise in opioid-related deaths have caused
problems for many counties and states, leaving them without remedies and
resources to restore their populations.5" In efforts to combat the opioid epidemic,
many states have filed civil actions against drug distributors for violations of
various laws.53 In 2017, the Attorney General of Ohio filed a civil action against
Purdue Pharma, Johnson & Johnson, Teva Pharmaceuticals, Endo Health
Solutions, and Allergan for the companies' roles in facilitating the opioid
epidemic within the State of Ohio.54 The state sought several remedies from the
drug companies, including an injunction to discontinue misrepresentations in the
marketing of opioids and damages paid to the state to reimburse money spent on
the opioid epidemic.55 The state sought these remedies after alleged deceptive
marketing by these companies facilitated the prescription of opioids to 2.3
56
million people within the state-accounting for 20% of Ohio's population.
While Ohio recently filed suit against drug companies, other states and cities

48

Id.

49

Id.
Id.
Id.

50
51

See Elizabeth Kneebone & Scott W. Allard, A Nation in Overdose Peril: Pinpointing the
52
Most Impacted Communities and the Local Gaps in Care, BROOKINGS (Sept. 25, 2017),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/pinpointing-opioid-in-most-impacted-communities/; see also
Anjali Tsui, Opioid Overdoses Are up Another 30 Percent, CDC Says, PBS FRONTLINE (Mar. 8,
3
2018), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/opioid-overdoses-are-up-another- 0-percentto
resources
without
communities
left
has
government
cdc-says/ (stating that lack of aid from
combat effects of opioid epidemic).
53
See generally Meg Tirrell, Ohio Attorney GeneralSues 5 Pharma Companies over Their
AM),
11:53
2017,
31,
(May
CNBC
Epidemic,
Opioid
the
in
Role
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/05/31/ohio-ag-sues-pharma-companies-over-their-role-in-theopioid-epidemic.html; Higham & Bernstein, supra note 13.
54
55
56

Id.
Id.
Id.
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have also filed suits against major drug distributors for their role in the opioid
epidemic. The Attorney General of Missouri filed suit against large drug
companies for damages the state incurred due to the abuse of opioids.57 The
Attorney General lashed out at pharmaceutical companies for misrepresentations
with regard to the addictive characteristics of opioids and for using fraudulent
science to back those assertions.58
Other cities and counties within states have filed lawsuits on their own
behalf against drug companies, each looking for a legal tool to stake a valid claim
for recovery.5 9 Recently, two West Virginia counties filed lawsuits against drug
companies for distributing excessive amounts of opioids into the state. 60 Between
2007 and 2012, drug manufacturers distributed 780 million opioids to the state
of West Virginia.6 1 These shipments supplied West Virginia with enough opioids
to distribute 433 pills to each resident of the state. 62 While other states have filed
suit against drug companies, the suits filed by West Virginia counties differ in
their allegations and legal mechanisms. As opposed to claiming that drug
companies misrepresented the characteristics of opioids, the counties instead
claim that the drug companies created a public health hazard to the citizens of
West Virginia by distributing an inordinate amount of opioids-a public
nuisance. 63
III.

PUBLIC NUISANCE LAW: BENDING A TRADITIONAL TORT TO FIT

MODERN PROBLEMS

Currently, numerous public nuisance lawsuits have been filed
throughout the country against opioid distributors for their conduct in the
distribution of opioids. 6 Local governments that need resources to remedy their
communities and treat residents addicted to opioids are seeking damages from
these distributors. The local governments in West Virginia and other states feel

57
See Missouri Attorney General Sues 3 Drug Companies over State's Opioid Crisis, CBS
NEWS (June 21, 2017, 5:10 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/opioid-crisis-missouri-attorney-

general-josh-hawley-sues-pharmaceutical-companies/.
58
Id.
59

See sources cited infra note 64.
Higham & Bernstein, supra note 13.
61
Margaret Talbot, The Addicts Next Door, THE NEW YORKER,
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/06/05/the-addicts-next-door.
62
Id.
63
Higham & Bernstein, supranote 13.
60

(June

5, 2017),

64
See Jan Hoffman, Can This Judge Solve the Opioid Crisis?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/05/health/opioid-crisis-judge-lawsuits.html; Greg Kocher &
Bill Estep, Wave of Kentucky Counties File Lawsuits Against Drug Distributorsfor Creating 'a
Public Nuisance', LEXINGTON HERALD LEADER (Sept.
12, 2017, 6:04 PM),
http://www.kentucky.com/news/state/article172934021.htm.
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that opioid distributors engaged in conduct that affects public health and
therefore violated a public right.6 5 As a result, West Virginia local governments
wish to abate the public nuisance that they claim opioid distributors created. This
section of the paper will discuss the common law doctrine of public nuisance.
Because West Virginia courts have not applied the tort of public nuisance to
distributors or manufacturers of products, this section will survey cases from
other jurisdictions to discuss the elements of public nuisance within the context
of product manufacturing and distribution. After providing rationales from other
jurisdictions, this section discusses the public nuisance claims set forth by Cabell
County and McDowell County, two local governments within the State of West
Virginia.
A.

The Common Law Doctrine of PublicNuisance

The legal theory of public nuisance originated in English common law
but has since expanded.6 6 The tort required four elements to be satisfied for
liability: (1) injury to a public right; (2) unreasonable conduct; (3) control of the
67
instrumentality causing the nuisance; and (4) proximate cause. Although these
elements were derived from common law, states' attempts to define public
nuisance further obscures the actual requirements. For example, the Florida
Supreme Court has referred to a public nuisance as an "annoyance to the
68
community or harm to public health." While Florida's definition seems
relatively straightforward, other state definitions are more complicated.69

See generally Is the Public Nuisance Universe Expanding?, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Jan. 31,
5 79 82 0 83
public
(discussing
122/
https://www.bna.com/public-nuisance-universe-n
2017),
adversely
which
in
products
produced
have
that
manufactures
product
against
nuisance lawsuits
affected the public health).
Victor E. Schwartz et al., Game Over? Why Recent Supreme Court Decisions Should End
66
65

the Attempted Expansion of Public Nuisance Law, 62 OKLA. L. REV. 629, 632 (2010).
Id. at 633-34.
67
68

Donald G. Gifford, Public Nuisance as a Mass Products Liability Tort, 71 U. CIN. L. REv.

741, 774 (2003).
Many states have codified the common law doctrine of public nuisance and, in doing so,
69
have also set forth statutory definitions of "public nuisance." For example, see MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 45-8-111 (West 2018), which defines a public nuisance as "a condition that endangers safety or
health, is offensive to the senses, or obstructs the free use of property so as to interfere with the
comfortable enjoyment of life or property by an entire community or neighborhood or by any
considerable number of persons." Compare N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-8-1 (West 2018) (stating that a
public nuisance is "knowingly creating, performing or maintaining anything affecting any number
of citizens without lawful authority which is either: injurious to public health, safety, morals or
welfare; or interferes with the exercise and enjoyment of public rights, including the right to use
public property"), with W. VA. CODE ANN. § 7-1-3kk (West 2018) (providing that the county
commission may eliminate "hazards to public health and safety and to abate or cause to be abated
anything which the commission determines to be a public nuisance").
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The Restatement provides that a public nuisance is "an unreasonable
interference with a right common to the general public."" ° Further, the
Restatement provides guidance on circumstances that determine what constitutes
an unreasonable interference with a public right.7' According to the Restatement,
[c]ircumstances that may sustain a holding that an interference
with a public right is unreasonable include the following:
(a) Whether the conduct involves a significant interference with
the public
health,
the public safety,
the public peace,
the public comfort or the public convenience, or
(b) whether the conduct is proscribed by a statute, ordinance or
administrative regulation, or
(c) whether the conduct is of a continuing nature or has produced
a permanent or long-lasting effect, and, as the actor knows or
has reason to know, has a significant effect upon
the public right.72
Although, traditionally, all four elements of the tort must be satisfied in
order to successfully prevail on a theory of public nuisance, plaintiffs have
sought to expand the law over recent decades.73 The Restatement (Second) of
Torts expanded public nuisance law by granting standing to a representative who
may sue on behalf of the general public.74 Thereafter, plaintiffs began to sue
manufacturers for products that annoyed or threatened the community or public
health. During the 1980s, litigation ensued against manufacturers for creating
public nuisances that unreasonably interfered with rights common to the general
public.75 Most of the suits alleged the substantial interference with the public
health. In the past, plaintiffs filed suits against car, asbestos, tobacco, and gun
manufacturers on the theory of public nuisance.76
Plaintiffs who have sued based upon the theory of public nuisance have
also generally mischaracterized the remedies available under public nuisance
law. 77 Although public nuisance law permits governments to abate public
nuisances, the law does not traditionally award monetary damages as a legal

70

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §

71

See id.
Id.

72

821B (AM.

LAW INST. 1979).

73
See generally Schwartz et al., supra note 66 (parsing attempted expansion of public nuisance
law into areas of product liability).
74
Id.at 637.
75

Id.

See id. at 637 39.
See Victor E. Schwartz & Phil Goldberg, The Law of Public Nuisance: Maintaining
Rational Boundaries on a Rational Tort, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 541, 570 (2006).
76

77
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remedy to government plaintiffs.78 Instead, the law provides for equitable
remedies, such as injunctions, and the court may award costs in abating the
nuisance to help aid local governments regulate conduct that is creating a public
nuisance. 79 The Restatement does allow actions for damages under the tort of
public nuisance but provides different standards for actions that seek damages
°
from actions that seek equitable relief 8 Government plaintiffs who are seeking
damages for the adverse effects of manufactured products, such as lead paint or
guns, have relied on theories of public nuisance to obtain relief.
Public nuisance arguably began to expand through litigation for
8
expenses related to the hazardous health effects from tobacco products. ' As a
result of the health problems caused by tobacco products, plaintiffs sued for
reimbursements for state health program expenditures that were tied to treating
the public with tobacco related illnesses.82 Although the courts never actually
resolved the case based on the merits of public nuisance law, the tobacco
3
companies settled the cases with states for $246 billion; however, one court
ultimately decided that the claim against tobacco companies on the basis of
84
public nuisance was outside the scope of the law. The court declined to hold
manufacturers liable through an expansion of public nuisance law.85 Though the
court denied the attempted expansion of public nuisance law in this case, public
nuisance was one of the claims against manufacturers for which the states
received settlement.8 6 Based upon this settlement, many plaintiffs have
attempted to sue manufacturers for damages that they have suffered as a result
of manufacturers' products. During recent years, courts have continued to deny
the expansion of the doctrine of public nuisance.
1. Violation of a Public Right-Lead Based Paint Litigation
In order to succeed on a claim of public nuisance against a manufacturer,
a plaintiff must establish that the manufacturer violated a public right. This is

See id. (discussing injunctions as a traditional remedy of public nuisance law for government
plaintiffs); see also Greg J. Carlson, Lead Paint: Who Will Bear the Cost of Abating the Latest
Public Nuisance?, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1553, 1573 (2008).
79
See Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 77, at 570.
78

§ 821B cmt. i (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (providing that the
accurate inquiry for actions seeking legal damages is "whether it is unreasonable to engage in the
conduct without paying for the harm done" whereas for actions seeking equitable relief the court
must determine "whether the activity itself is so unreasonable that it must be stopped").
81
Gifford, supra note 68, at 758-63.
See Schwartz et al., supra note 66, at 638.
82
80

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS

83

Id.
Id.
Id
See id.

84
85
86
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often a difficult standard in public nuisance law, especially when suing based on
products that have been produced by manufacturers but are privately
consumed. " The courts have wrestled with this element and have ultimately held
that the term "public right" is to be construed to include common rights that have
historically been protected by public nuisance law-the common use of water
ways and public highways.8" Even in the case of protecting children from the
hazards of lead based paint, the Rhode Island Supreme Court, in State of Rhode
Island v. Lead Industries Ass'n, Inc.,8 9 declined to expand public nuisance law
and impose liability on paint manufacturers. 9' The court determined that
production of an environmental hazard did not constitute an interference with a
public right as required by public nuisance law. 91
A public right is an interest that is common to the general public, as
opposed to an interest of one or several individuals. 92 "It is not... necessary that
the entire community be affected by a public nuisance, so long as the nuisance
will interfere with those who come in contact with it in the exercise of a public
right or it otherwise affects the interests of the community at large." 93 A public
right is collective in nature and is not violated if conduct affects only some
individuals of a community. 94 Instead, an interference of a public right more
likely occurs when there is interference with a resource that is communal among
the general public "like air, water, and public rights of way." 95 Further, the
Supreme Court of Rhode Island in Lead Industries, discussed the differences
between a public right and a public interest-concluding that what constitutes a
public interest is broader than a public right.9 6 The court agreed that". . . while
it is in the public interest to promote the health and well-being of citizens
generally, there is no common law public right to a certain standard of medical
care or housing." 97

87

See DONALD

G.

GIFFORD,

SUING

THE TOBACCO

GOVERNMENT LITIGATION AS PUBLIC HEALTH PRESCRIPTION
88
89

90
91
92

AND

LEAD PIGMENT INDUSTRIES:

146 (2010).

See id at 145.
951 A.2d 428 (R.I. 2008).

Id.
Id.at 453-54.
Id. at 447.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821 B cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
Lead Indus. Ass'n, 951 A.2d at 448 (discussing the pollution of a stream that bars only a
few farmers from retrieving water from that stream does not constitute interference with a public
right but that pollution of a stream that bars a community's right to fish within the stream does
constitute a public right).
95 Id. (quoting City of Chicago v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 823 N.E.2d 126, 132 (111. App. Ct.
93
94

2005)).
96
See id.
97

Id.(quoting Gifford, supra note 68, at 815).
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The court held that the state's assertion that it had a public right to be
free from health hazards that were occurring due to unabated lead did not
constitute a public right within the traditional contexts that the law had been
used.98 The court determined that the right of children not to be poisoned by lead
paint was an individual right and was, in fact, similar to other individual rights
that had been dismissed by other courts.9 9 Despite efforts of the state, the court
sided with other courts and reiterated that a public right did not include the right
to be free from "unreasonable jeopardy to health" caused by products of
manufacturers.' 00 Therefore, the court declined to impose liability on
manufacturers because it would expand public nuisance law to a context that was
never intended.' 0 '
2.

Establishing Unreasonable Interference in Public Nuisance Law

A plaintiff must establish that a manufacturer has unreasonably
interfered with a public right in order to successfully succeed on a claim for
public nuisance. In order to clarify what constitutes unreasonable interference,
the Restatement (Second) of Torts offers some statutory guidance in regards to
this element. 1 2 As previously discussed, the court may examine certain
circumstances in which an unreasonable interference may occur including
"significant interference" with the public health, safety, convenience, or
comfort.103 Further, a court may examine whether the conduct is permitted by
05
law104 and whether the conduct has produced a long lasting effect.' This effect
would provide the actor with sufficient reason to know that the conduct is having
a significant effect on a public right. 0' 6
Although the Restatement provides some guidance on this element of
public nuisance law, elaboration upon this element largely derives from common
law. In City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 07 the Supreme Court of Illinois
examined claims of the City of Chicago in the face of damages as a result from
gun violence. 0 8 The court parsed the claims of the city against gun

98

Id. at 453.

99

Id. at 454.
Id.

1o0

101 Id. at 453.
102

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1979).

103

Id. § 821B(2)(a).

104

Id. § 821B(2)(b).

105

Id. § 821B(2)(c).

106

Id.

107

821 N.E.2d 1099 (Il. 2004).

108

Id. at 1117.
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manufacturers and examined what constitutes unreasonable interference in the
context of manufacturing and distributing products that result in harm. 09
The Supreme Court of Illinois examined the standard set forth by
common law within the State of Illinois. At common law in Illinois, an
unreasonable interference with the public right is established if a manufacturer
negligently operated its business."' The court must examine whether the
manufacturer acted negligently and whether the conduct created a "significant"
effect on a public right." 1'Because this part of a public nuisance claim is
established through negligent conduct, the court must examine whether or not
the manufacturer owed a duty of care to the public.12 To determine whether the
gun manufacturers owed a duty to the City of Chicago in this case, the court
examined the necessary elements of duty under Illinois common law." 3
In order to determine that a manufacturer owed a duty to the general
public and therefore unreasonably interfered with a public right, the court
examines public policy considerations. These public policy considerations
include "(1) the reasonable foreseeability of the injury; (2) the likelihood of the
injury; (3) the magnitude of the burden of guarding against the injury; and (4)
the consequences of placing that burden on the defendant." ' 1 4 The City of
Chicago specifically alleged that gun manufacturers owed a duty to Chicago
residents by exercising reasonable care." 5 The city claimed that manufacturers
had a duty to ensure that guns did not end up in the hands of individuals who
illegally possess and use guns." 6 The Supreme Court disagreed and ultimately
held that the gun manufacturers did not owe a duty to the public. "7
The court discussed the four public policy considerations in order to
determine whether the gun manufacturers owed a duty to the public and therefore
unreasonably interfered with a public right. Although the court agreed that it is
reasonably foreseeable that permitting the sale of guns will result in the criminal
acquisition of firearms, it is less foreseeable that the sale of firearms will result
in a public nuisance within a community. "8 Further, the court explained that
imposing the changes sought by the city was too great of a burden on gun
manufacturers and distributors because it would require substantial changes to

109

See id

110

Id.at 1125.

112

Id.

112

Id.
Id.

113
114

Id.(citing Bajwa v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 804 N.E.2d 519, 528 (11. 2004)).

116

Id. at 1109.
Id.

117
118

Id.at 1126.
Id.

115
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their business practices." 9 The court also explained that the city's proposed
positive outcomes of saving lives and fostering a safer community were merely
speculative. 2 ° The court stated that "the negative consequence of judicially
imposing a duty upon commercial enterprises to guard against the criminal
misuse of their products by others will be an unprecedented expansion of the law
of public nuisance."' 21 Therefore, because the burden on the manufacturer to
change business practices was far too great and the potential outcomes were
uncertain, the court held that gun manufacturers did not owe a duty to the City
of Chicago. 22
The Supreme Court of Illinois is not alone in applying a negligence
23
standard in order to evaluate public nuisance claims.' Although some states
may apply a negligence standard to determine whether there was an unreasonable
interference with a public right, states may also examine whether the conduct
significantly interferes with public health, is permitted by law, and has a long
' The Restatement also provides that a negligence standard may
lasting effect. 24
25
whether an unreasonable interference has occurred. '
determining
be used in
Although it might seem that a negligence standard may be easy to prove, it islikely more difficult when trying to show that a manufacturer owed a duty to the
general public. Even if a plaintiff can establish that the manufacturer owed a duty
to the public and that an unreasonable interference with a public right occurred,
the plaintiff may have more difficulty establishing that the manufacturer
exercised sufficient control.

1"9

Id.

120

Id.

121

Id.

122

Id.

See City of Cleveland v. Ameriquest Mortg. Sec., Inc., 621 F. Supp. 2d 513, 521 (N.D.Ohio
2009) (citing Allen Freight Lines, Inc. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 595 N.E.2d 855, 856 (Ohio 1992))
("Because it is premised upon negligence, a qualified nuisance claimant must plead and prove the
traditional elements thereof: duty, breach, proximate causation, and damages."); see also District
of Columbia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 872 A.2d 633, 646 (D.C. 2009) ("The question, nevertheless,
is whether the District has sufficiently pleaded that cause of action, and the answer depends
critically on how prepared we are to loosen the tort from the traditional moorings of duty,
proximate causation, foreseeability, and remoteness that have made us reject the plaintiffs' claim
of negligence.").
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821 B (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
124
123

125 Id. § 821B cmt. e (stating that "the defendant is held liable for a public nuisance if his
interference with the public right was intentional or was unintentional and otherwise actionable
under the principles controlling liability for negligent or reckless conduct or for abnormally
dangerous activities").
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Maintaining the Causal Connection: Establishing Proximate Cause

The last element that must be established in a public nuisance case is
proximate cause. It is not enough to establish a public right, an unreasonable
interference, and control. The plaintiffs must demonstrate that a causal link exists
between the manufacturers' conduct and the damages that have occurred.
Proximate cause has been discussed in length by many jurisdictions in relation
to public nuisance and products produced by manufacturers. Part i of this section
will discuss what constitutes proximate cause in public nuisance law and Part ii
will demonstrate how third-party actions may break the causation chain.
Proximate cause is somewhat debated in relation to public nuisance law.
Although proximate cause is often evaluated based on the reasonable
foreseeability of harm that results from a defendant's conduct, 126 many courts
have also determined a plaintiff must establish that the manufacturer exercised
"sufficient control" over the product that caused the injury. 27 Many courts,
including the, Fourth Circuit, have emphasized control and discussed a
manufacturer's control of the product as a part of proximate cause and a factor
28
that may be determinate of liability.
i.

ConstitutingSufficient Control

In the 1990s, cities filed suits against gun manufacturers to gain
reimbursement for law enforcement and public health expenses as a result of gun
violence. 2 9 The cities argued that gun manufacturers were liable for public
nuisance through marketing and sales tactics, which aided in the creation of an
illegal gun market and interfered with public health and safety, creating a public
nuisance. 3 ° The courts in these cases also determined that holding gun
manufacturers liable for engaging in lawful conduct that did not affect the
property of others would be an unlawful expansion of public nuisance law. 13'
The court held that the plaintiffs had not claimed a valid public right nor had the
manufacturers engaged in unreasonable conduct as required by public nuisance
law. 32
' Ultimately, attempts to expand public nuisance law once again failed.

See Schwartz & Goldberg, supranote 77, at 569.
127
See id. at 567.
128
See generallyLiberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. JM Smith Corp., 602 F. App'x 115, 121 (4th Cir.
2015) (discussing the conduct of physicians, pharmacies, and distributors whose conduct alone
could have caused the opioid epidemic complicates the chain of causation).
129
See Schwartz et al., supranote 66, at 639.
130
Id.
126

131

Id.

132

Id.
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The Third Circuit in Camden Cty. Bd.of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta
U.S.A. Corp.,13 3 declined to hold gun manufacturers liable where a county in
New Jersey alleged that gun manufacturers' marketing and distribution of guns
constituted a public nuisance. 13 4 Specifically, the county alleged that the
manufacturers' conduct endangered the public health of citizens through the
facilitation of a handgun distribution system that provided easy access of guns to
' The county alleged that it suffered significant losses related to gun
criminals. 35
violence that likely stemmed from manufacturers releasing more guns into the
36
market than they expected law abiding citizens would purchase. 1 Further, the
county alleged that the manufactures did not adequately monitor the sales of
handguns, nor did they take any action to mitigate the damage that stemmed from
'
their conduct. 37
The court applied public nuisance law of New Jersey and noted that the
38
county had failed to allege a vital element of the claim-control. 1 According to
New Jersey law, for an interference with a public right to be actionable, a
9
manufacturer must exert control over its source."' The court held that the
manufacturers were not liable for public nuisance claims because the chain of
causation was too sparse to connect gun manufacturers to the effects of gun
violence. 4' 0 The court declined to hold manufacturers liable for the actions of
third parties who divert guns to unauthorized owners because the manufacturers
4
had no control whatsoever over third party dealers."' The court stated "[t]he
manufacturers may not be held responsible 'without a more tangible showing
that the defendants were a direct link [in] the causal chain that resulted in the
plaintiffs' injuries, and that defendants were realistically in a position to prevent
the wrongs."" 142 Ultimately, the court held that the nuisance created by gun
of gun manufacturers and therefore, the
violence was not within the control
43
liable.1
not
were
manufacturers
Although many attempts to expand public nuisance laws have failed, the
reasoning that the courts provided is insightful. Some suggest that these failed
attempts signal the end of public nuisance law as a theory for manufacturer

133 273 F.3d 536 (3d Cir. 2001).
134

Id. at 540.

135 Id. at 538.
136

Id.

137

Id.

138

Id.

139

Id.

at 539.

140 Id. at 541.
141

Id.

142

Id. (quoting Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055, 1062 (N.Y. 2001)

(alteration consistent with original)).
143

Id.
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liability, but many plaintiffs continue to assert the theory of public nuisance
against manufacturers, including the manufacturers of lead paint and opioid
distributors. 1" The persistence of plaintiffs in the use of public nuisance is
admirable, but the doctrine is unworkable in the context of product
manufacturing and distributing that merely affects public health.
ii.

Reasonable ForeseeabilityAmong Multiple Actors

In order to determine whether an injury resulted from conduct, the court
must examine whether the injury was reasonably foreseeable. 45 In examining
proximate cause, the court also examines cause in fact and legal cause. 146 Both
of these requirements must be established in order to hold a defendant liable for
public nuisance. If the act of the defendant did not factually and legally cause
injury to the plaintiff, then the defendant cannot be held liable for public
nuisance.
In City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., the Supreme Court of Illinois

examined both cause in fact and legal cause to determine whether the city had
established proximate cause. 147 According to the Supreme Court, "cause in fact,
is present, 'when there is reasonable certainty that a defendant's acts caused the
injury or damage.'" 1 48 To satisfy this requirement a plaintiff must show that the
injury would not have occurred absent the defendant's conduct.1 49 If many
factors are involved in bringing about the injury, then the Illinois Supreme Court
examines whether or not the defendant's conduct is a "material element and
substantial factor in bringing about the injury."' 5 °
In examining legal cause, the court must examine how closely related
the defendant's conduct is to the injury that occurred."'5 The Supreme Court of
Illinois determines legal cause through a test of foreseeability. ' The Supreme
Court examines "whether the injury is of a type that a reasonable person would
see as a likely result of his conduct." 5' 3 This foreseeability is used to establish
proximate cause in compliance with the remoteness doctrine. If an injury is too

144

See Gifford, supra note 68, at 773-74; Higham & Bernstein, supra note 13.

145
146

See Schwartz & Goldberg, supranote 77, at 569.
City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099, 1127 (Ill. 2004).

147

Id.

148

Id.

149
150

Id.
Id.

151

Id.

152

See id

153

Id.
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"remote" from the conduct of the defendant, then the defendant cannot be liable
54
for damages related to that injury. 1
The doctrine of remoteness examines reasonably foreseeable
consequences of a defendant's conduct to establish the chain of causation;
however, when the criminal acts of independent third parties also bring about
damages to the plaintiff, liability generally will not be imposed upon the
defendant.' 5 5 In City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., the Illinois Supreme

Court refused to impose liability on gun manufacturers due in part to the criminal
' The Supreme Court acknowledged
sales of guns by independent third parties. 56
that even though it might have been foreseeable that producing and distributing
guns would foster gun violence, the Supreme Court stated, ".

..

[T]he alleged

public nuisance is not so foreseeable to the dealer defendants that their conduct
can be deemed a legal cause of a nuisance that is a result of the aggregate of the
criminal acts of many individuals over whom they have no control."' 5 7
The Fourth Circuit has also discussed remoteness in proximate cause of
public nuisance claims. The Fourth Circuit examined the duty of an insurance
company to defend its insured customers against a lawsuit brought by the West
Virginia Attorney General for creating a public nuisance through distribution of
opioids. "' In determining whether the insurance company had a duty to defend
drug manufacturers, the Circuit Court acknowledged that the chain of causation
was obscure and indirect. 5 9 The causal chain included drug manufactures that
distributed opioids to pharmacies that then distributed those opioids to patients
who may have been abusing opioids, which resulted in damages to the State of
West Virginia. 6 ° The facts alleged created a chain of causation that involved
many parties whose own individual actions could have resulted in the damages
incurred by the state.16' However, the Fourth Circuit held that a duty to defend
existed because there was a possibility that the lower court may find that the drug
manufacturers did not exercise sufficient care in distributing opioids that brought
about accidental harm to the state of West Virginia. 162 Ultimately, the lower
courts must examine the defendant's control of the substance causing harm and
the remoteness of the defendant's conduct from the damages suffered by the
plaintiff.

154

See id. at 1132; see also District of Columbia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 872 A.2d 633, 648

(D.C. 2005).
155
156
157

City of Chicago, 821 N.E.2d 1099, 1134-35 (Ill. 2004).
Id. at 1136.
Id. at 1138.

158

See Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. JM Smith Corp., 602 F. App'x 115, 116 (4th Cir. 2015).

159
160

Id. at 121.
Id.

161

Id.

162

Id. at 122.
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West Virginia'sPublic Nuisance Lawsuits

West Virginia has yet to discuss public nuisance law in the context of
products that have been produced by manufacturers. Traditionally, West Virginia
common law has addressed roadways, obstructions, waterways, hazardous
163
wastes and other typical subjects of public nuisance law in other states.
However, with the recent filings of public nuisance lawsuits within the state of
West Virginia, the courts will likely need to examine West Virginia law and other
jurisdictions to decide whether or not opioid distributors are liable for damages
to local governments. The complaints filed by the West Virginia counties allege
that pharmaceutical drug distributors have created a public nuisance through
distribution practices that have caused economic damages to the counties.' 64
These counties seek to abate the public nuisance under their authority granted by
West Virginia statutory law. 165 The counties claim that they are entitled to relief
and aid in remedying the problems that are associated with a population that is
66
addicted to opioids.1

163
See Sharon Steel Corp. v. City of Fairmont, 334 S.E.2d 616, 619-22 (W. Va. 1985)
(discussing public nuisance in the context of hazardous wastes); Clay Cty. Ct. v. Adams, 155 S.E.
174, 177-78 (W. Va. 1930) (discussing what constitutes public nuisance when a public road is
obstructed); City of Martinsburg v. Miles, 121 S.E. 285, 286-87 (W. Va. 1924) (discussing public
nuisance in the context of obstructions to a sidewalk).
164
Complaint at 4, Cabell Cty. Comm'n v. AmerisourceBergen Drug Corp., No. 3:17-CV01665 (S.D.W. Va. 2017); Amended Complaint at 26, Cty. Comm'n of McDowell Cty. v.
McKesson Corp., 263 F. Supp. 3d 639 (S.D.W. Va. 2017).
165
See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 7-1-3kk (West 2018).
In addition to all other powers and duties now conferred by law upon county
commissions, commissions are hereby authorized to enact ordinances, issue
orders and take other appropriate and necessary actions for the elimination of
hazards to public health and safety and to abate or cause to be abated anything
which the commission determines to be a public nuisance. The ordinances may
provide for a misdemeanor penalty for its violation. The ordinances may
further be applicable to the county in its entirety or to any portion of the county
as considered appropriate by the county commission.
Id.; see also W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-6 (West 2018).
The state director of health or any county or municipal health officer shall
inquire into and investigate all nuisances affecting the public health within his
jurisdiction; and the said director or any such officer or the county commission
of any county or any municipality is authorized and empowered to apply to the
circuit court of the county in which any such nuisance exists, or to the judge
thereof in vacation, for an injunction forthwith to restrain, prevent or abate
such nuisance.
Id.
166

See Complaint, supra note 164, at 35; Amended Complaint, supra note 164, at 29-30.
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1.

Cabell County Seeks Damages to Fight Opioid Addiction

The Cabell County Commission has filed suit against ten prescription
drug manufacturers and distributors for creating a public nuisance within the
county.' 67 Cabell County has authority to bring this suit by West Virginia
statutory law, which gives county commissions the power to enact ordinances or
take other appropriate actions to address threats to the public health and safety. 6'
Additionally, the statute provides that county commissions may also "abate or
cause to be abated anything which the commission determines to be a public
nuisance."' 69 Cabell County filed suit based on the claim that the defendants'
distribution practices were hazards to the public health and safety and that the
70
county had a right to abate the public nuisance that the defendants created.
Cabell County alleged that the defendants violated a public right in their
7
According
complaint, which is a necessary element of public nuisance claims.
to the complaint that was filed in the Southern District of West Virginia,
"prescription opiate abuse, addiction, morbidity, and mortality" are hazards to
72
To
the public health, public safety, and are a temporary public nuisance.'
Cabell
created,
allegedly
have
defendants
the
that
nuisance
the
public
remedy
County seeks economic damages from the defendants in order to eliminate the
73
hazards to public health and abate the public nuisance.'
Cabell County also contends that the defendants breached duties that
74
Further, the
they owed under both federal law and West Virginia law.'
complaint contends that the defendants were well aware of the duties imposed
75
on them by these laws because some of the laws had been in effect for 40 years. '
Cabell County also provided facts that each defendant was on notice of these
duties after receiving letters and reminders from the Drug Enforcement Agency
76
As a
about their duties and responsibilities as prescription drug distributors.
it
damage
the
that
contends
County
Cabell
duties,
these
of
breach
result of the
77
'
foreseeable.
reasonably
was
incurred through opiate and heroin addiction
Cabell County alleges that defendants' failures to adequately monitor,
refuse, and report suspicious orders of prescription opiates is a proximate cause

167

Complaint, supra note 164, at 1.

168

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 7-1-3kk.

169

Id.

170

See Complaint, supra note 164, at 4.

171

See id.

172

See id.at 4,32.

173

Id.

174

Id. at 9.

at 37.

175 Id. at 10.
See id.
176
177

See id.at 15.
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of the public nuisance and the damages that the county has incurred. 178
Specifically, Cabell County claims that defendants conduct is a proximate cause
of the diversion of opioids for nonmedical uses, the opioid epidemic within
Cabell County, and the heroin epidemic within Cabell County.' 7 9 Although
Cabell County has pleaded facts that allege misconduct on behalf of opioid
distributors, the complaint fails to allege facts that establish the necessary
elements of a public nuisance claim.
2.

McDowell County Demands Protection of the "Public Rights" of
Citizens

The County Commission of McDowell County has also filed a lawsuit
against prescription drug distributors and the West Virginia Board of Pharmacy
for creating a public nuisance within McDowell County by distributing "millions
of doses of commonly-abused, highly addictive controlled substances."180
McDowell County claims that the defendants, in breaching their duties, have
engaged in unreasonable conduct that interfered with citizens' rights to be free
from unwarranted injuries, addictions, annoyances, and overdoses that affect the
safety of others. 8' The county also contends that the defendants' conduct has
inflicted damages upon the county and residents of the county who have not only
become addicted to opioids, but those who have been adversely affected by the
addiction of others.' 82 McDowell County, like Cabell County, alleges that the
defendants engaged in unreasonable distribution of opioids that caused the
diversion of prescription opioids into an illicit illegal market, thereby creating a
public nuisance.that the county wishes to abate.' 83
According to the Second Amended Complaint, the county is entitled to
abate the nuisance that the defendants created because the defendants' failure to
adequately monitor the distribution of opioids and inability to report suspicious
orders was the direct and proximate cause of the harm suffered by the county and
its residents.184 Because the defendants had notice and knowledge of the opioid
epidemic within the state of West Virginia, McDowell County contends that the
damages to the county were reasonably foreseeable consequences of the
defendants' conduct.18 5 The drug distributors disregarded all available

181

Id.at 25.
See id. at 25 26.
Amended Complaint, supra note 164, at 29.
See id. at 27.

182

Id.

183

Id. at 27-28.

184

Id. at 28-29.

185

See id (asserting that opioid distributors were on notice of the existing opioid epidemic yet

178
179
180

engaged in a pattern of distributing opioid that were known to be abused).
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information regarding the severity of the opioid epidemic throughout the country
and in the state of West Virginia. 86 McDowell County contends that this
intentional and malicious disregard as well as the inadequate distribution
practices threatened and continues to threaten the public health and safety of
McDowell County and its residents.' 8 7 Therefore, McDowell County seeks
damages for assistance in abating the public nuisance, punitive damages, and a
permanent restraining order against the defendants. 88
IV.

CASE STUDY: APPLICATION OF PUBLIC NUISANCE LAW TO WEST
VIRGINIA CLAIMS

Although public nuisance traditionally was not a theory of liability
intended to hold manufacturers and distributors liable for negligent practices,
many plaintiffs have used this theory to file lawsuits against gun manufacturers,
paint producers, tobacco companies, and now prescription opioid distributors;
however, plaintiffs have had little success with these lawsuits. Courts across
jurisdictions should not hold opioid distributors liable for public nuisance
because the conduct and violation of rights alleged fail to establish the basic
elements of the tort. This section will use the complaints of Cabell and McDowell
Counties to provide an analysis that will be useful across jurisdictions.
Subsection A will assert that the counties have failed to allege the violation of a
valid public right within the traditional application of the law. Subsection B will
examine how plaintiffs are unable to establish that prescription opioid
distributors exercised sufficient control over opioids that actually caused
damages to the counties. Subsection C determines that the damages incurred by
the counties are too remote from the conduct of opioid distributors to establish
causation. Because the counties are unable to establish the elements of a public
nuisance claim and previous courts have declined to hold manufacturers liable
for public nuisance, courts should decline to expand public nuisance liability.
A.

UnwarrantedAddiction, Morbidity, and Mortality Fail to Establish
Valid Public Rights

Traditionally, public nuisance law did not include threat or harm to a
person or set of persons. Instead, a public right was something that all
communities used or were entitled to use. However, plaintiffs have misconstrued
this element and have attempted to expand public right to any conduct that affects
public health.' 89 For example, McDowell County has alleged that the opioid
distributors' conduct interfered with citizens' rights to be free from unwarranted

186

See id. at 178.

188

Id. at 29.
Id. at 29-30.

189

See supra Section III.A. 1.

187
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addiction, overdoses, injuries, and diseases.19 Cabell County has claimed that
the opioid distributors' conduct harmed the public health through "opioid and
heroin abuse, addiction, morbidity, and mortality" and claims that these are
threats to the public health and safety.1 91
Local governments will likely argue that West Virginia law grants them
more leeway under this element than the restatement allows. Cabell and
McDowell counties will likely argue that the law in West Virginia permits the
abatement of nuisances that affect public health 192 and allows the elimination of
'
"hazards to public health" 193
while the restatement requires a significant
interference with public health.194 Courts should be wary of this argument. The
counties are seeking to take advantage of an area of law that is underdeveloped
in West Virginia. Moreover, West Virginia courts have adopted the Restatement
(Second) of Torts in discussing public nuisance law.' 95 Although it may seem
that the law in West Virginia provides more leeway, holding opioid distributors
liable contrary to the rationales of other jurisdictions could have serious
consequences for businesses in West Virginia that produce or distribute products
that merely "affect" the public health. Instead, courts in West Virginia and other
states should examine the interpretations of other jurisdictions on what
constitutes a public right.
There is no common law right to be free from health hazards or a product
that may be dangerous to health. 196 Courts have reiterated that, although it is
desirable to be free from products that may pose hazards to a person's health,
this is a public interest-not a public right.' 97 Even in the case of products that
are dangerous to the health of children, courts have determined that the right to
be free from lead based paint is an individual right and not a communal interest
held by the public.' 98 Because courts have construed the element of public right
to include traditional communal interests, the right to be free from addiction,
morbidity, and mortality should be considered an individual right, not a
communal interest held by the public.

192

See Amended Complaint, supra note 164, at 27.
Complaint, supra note 164, at 32-33.
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-6 (West 2018).

193

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 7-1-3kk.

194

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

190
191

§ 821B (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
See Sharon Steel Corp. v. City of Fairmont, 334 S.E.2d 616, 620 (W. Va. 1985) (citing Hark
v. Mountain Fork Lumber Co., 34 S.E.2d 348, 354 (W. Va. 1945)) (defining public nuisance as
"an act or condition that unlawfully operates to hurt or inconvenience an indefinite number of
persons"); see also Duff v. Morgantown Energy Assocs., 421 S.E.2d 253, n.6 (W. Va. 1992)
(stating that the Court believes the definition for public nuisance set forth by Sharon Steel Corp. is
consistent with the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 82 1B).
196
See State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 951 A.2d 428, 448 (R.I. 2008).
197
Id. (citing Gifford, supra note 68, at 815).
198
Id. at 453.
195
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Although being free from addiction and disease is certainly a public
interest, enjoying good health is not a communal interest that everyone enjoys
nor has the right to enjoy. 99 It does not share the same qualities as a communal
stream from which everyone receives their food or a roadway that each person
uses for access to another part of town. 2" Instead, good health, or the right to be
free from health defects, is an individual quality that each person enjoys at an
individual level. 2 1 Although others' poor health may cause adverse effects on
citizens of the community, this alone does not make it a communal interest or a
public right.
The desire and interest to be free from addiction and disease is likely
more closely tied to the lead-based paint litigation, which concerned the health
of children. The court declined to expand public nuisance law to encompass
interests that have not typically been construed as a public right, including the
20 2
The apprehension of
right to be free from "unreasonable jeopardy to health.
courts to expand public nuisance law likely rests on public policy concerns and
the role that manufacturers and distributors play in society. Corporations and
business interests tend to take precedence in the eyes of the courts in recent
years.20 3 Although certain products may undoubtedly pose risks to a person's
health, the benefit of the product may potentially outweigh the harm, or the harm
may be easily eliminated. This is likely the case with opioid distribution because
the opioids themselves benefit patients, but the plaintiffs claim that the
distributors did not adequately market the opioids and completely disclose the

addictive nature of the drugs. 2"
Business interests and policy concerns should carry some weight in
deciding whether to expand public nuisance law; however, in the case of opioid

distributors, based upon the facts set forth in the McDowell and Cabell County
20 5
Instead, the plaintiffs have
complaints, no public right has been pleaded.

pleaded that the negligent distribution of opioids is basically an "unreasonable

See id. at 448.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
200
Compare Gifford, supra note 68, at 817, with Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 77, at 562.
201
Lead Indus. Ass'n, 951 A.2d at 454.
202
See Adam Winkler, Why Big Business Keeps Winning at the Supreme Court, WASH. POST
203
2
(June 26, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/ 017/06/26/why-bigterm=.72b2538c0f59.
business-keeps-winning-at-the-supreme-court/?utm
See Courtney Hessler, Drug Firms Pressfor DismissalofLawsuits, HERALD DISPATCH (Apr.
204
199

http://www.herald-dispatch.com/news/drug-firms-press-for-dismissal-of2017),
15,
lawsuits/article_1 55bcb0a-4d40-5569-b 198-15311 cc24898.html.
Compare Complaint, supra note 164, at 4, and Amended Complaint, supra note 164, at 26,
205
with Lead Indus. Ass'n, 951 A.2d at 454 (comparing public nuisance actions against opioid
distributors against public nuisance actions against lead producers where the court determined that
no public right had been pleaded).
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jeopardy to health. 2 °6 Although the distribution of opioids has caused economic
damages to residents and governments of West Virginia, the plaintiffs have failed
to assert an actionable public right under public nuisance law.
B. The IndividualActions of Doctors, Pharmacies,Government Agencies,
andPatientsNegate OpioidDistributor'sControl
Opioid distributors are responsible for distributing opioids to pharmacies
and physicians' offices for professionals to provide to patients. Physicians are
responsible for prescribing opioids, and pharmacies must fill the orders that the
physician prescribes if the physician cannot provide the drugs. A plaintiff must
prove that the distributor exercised sufficient control over the product in order to
be successful on a public nuisance claim.20 7 If third parties other than the
distributor also exercised control over the product, which may have caused
damages to the plaintiff, a court may determine that the distributor did not
exercise sufficient control and is not the cause of the damages. 208
In the case of prescription opioid distributors, the court should not
determine that the opioid distributors exercised sufficient control over the
opioids unless the plaintiff can establish a causal chain between the distributors'
conduct and the damages that the plaintiffs incurred. However, in this case,
similar to the gun manufacturer cases, third parties are responsible for
prescribing, filling, and sometimes administering opioids to citizens.20 9 Further,
patients who may not need opioid medication could obtain opioids from a
physician and sell the opioids to others who are abusing the drug. Patients,
physicians, and pharmacies could have engaged in conduct that would have
contributed to the opioid epidemic and the damages that it has created to counties
and municipalities.
McDowell and Cabell Counties have both alleged that the opioid
distributors' have fostered the opioid epidemic by not adequately monitoring the
distribution process of opioids. Specifically, the counties allege that the opioid
distributors are required to report suspicious orders of opioids.2 Because
statistics show that the state of West Virginia has received a surplus of opioids
in the past,2 11 the counties contend that the opioid distributors did not report
extremely large orders for opioids that exceeded the amount necessary for

206

207
208

Lead Indus. Ass'n, 951 A.2d at 454.
See supra Section Il.A.3.i.
Camden Cty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp. 273 F.3d 536, 541 (3d Cir.

2001).
209

210
211

See Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. v. JM Smith Corp., 602 F. App'x 115, 121-22 (4th Cir. 2015).
See Complaint, supra note 164, at 25; Amended Complaint, supra note 164, at 3.
See Higham & Bernstein, supra note 13.
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medical purposes.2 12 Through this conduct, the counties allege that the opioid
distributors are responsible for the diversion of opioids into an illicit market
2 13
Although
whereby addicts buy and abuse opioids for nonmedical purposes.
the opioid distributors may have exercised some control and failed to report
suspicious orders, the plaintiffs cannot likely tie the opioid distributors conduct
alone to the creation of an illicit market.
First, opioid distributors will likely refute their control over opioids and
the creation of an illicit market by blaming patients for their role in opioid
misuse. Patients who were addicted to opioids or who wanted to profit from the
addiction of others could have visited physicians in order to receive a
prescription. If a patient was addicted but was no longer able to receive opioids,
the patient would likely turn to others who had a prescription or find other ways
to cope with their addiction, which may have included drugs like heroin. Even if
a patient received a prescription, the patient could have become addicted to
opioids if the patient did not comply with the directions provided with the drug.
Distributors will argue that they did not solely contribute to the illicit market
because patients, through their own actions, could have played a significant role
in opioid and heroin abuse. The distributors will also argue that patients could.
have received a prescription and then diverted that prescription to others, thereby
creating an illicit market even though the prescription they received was valid
and legitimate. These arguments will reduce the amount of control that the
distributors were able to exercise over opioids because once the opioids were
distributed to physicians and patients, the distributors had no say in how those
opioids were used.2 14
Patients rely upon physicians to responsibly treat their ailments, which
include pain management. Doctors who over-prescribed opioids are also likely
at-fault and exercised control over opioids that trickled down into an illicit
market. Some doctors may engage in over-prescribing opioids, regardless of
whether they practice in hospitals, practice in emergency rooms, or have their
own private practice.215 Other doctors may refrain from prescribing opioids.
When doctors prescribe opioids they may not adequately warn patients about the
addictive nature of opioids, or they may not adequately direct the patient on when

212
213

See Complaint, supra note 164, at 25; Amended Complaint, supra note 164, at 3.
See Complaint, supra note 164, at 25; Amended Complaint, supra note 164, at 3.

This is not to say that opioid distributors have no fault in the facilitation or fostering of the
opioid epidemic. Nor does this section seek to lay blame on those patients who have become
addicted to opioids. Instead, this section intends to set forth potential arguments of opioid
distributors in refuting their control under public nuisance claims.
See Teresa Carr, Some Doctors Still Prescribe Too Many Opioids, CDC Finds: What You
215
214

2017),
6,
(July
REPS.
Find Safer Pain Relief, CONSUMER
to
Do
Can
https://www.cnsumerreports.org/opioids/some-d.-prescribe-to-many-opioids-cdcfinds/.
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it is appropriate to take an opioid.216 Patients who visit a physician for back pain
or some other acute pain may end up becoming addicted if that physician is more
likely to manage pain through opioid prescriptions.2 17 Physicians' play a
significant role in whether a patient receives an opioid prescription and whether
that patient has been fully briefed on the benefits and dangers of an opioid
prescription. 281 Because physicians have a significant role in the disbursement of
opioids and information, drug distributors will argue that they cannot be held
liable for the conduct of physicians who over prescribe opioids and do not
communicate the dangers of the medication. The conduct of physicians weakens
the amount of control that opioid distributors exercise over opioids that have
contributed to the creation of an illicit market, which has caused damage to
communities.
The arguments that opioid distributors will set forth are similar to the
reasons that courts have given in declining to hold gun manufacturers liable for
the negative effects from gun distribution and the illicit market that it has
created.219 Courts declined to hold distributors and manufacturers liable where
the manufacturers or distributors had no control over the actions of third
parties.22 ° Opioid distributors will argue that, like gun manufacturers, the opioid
distributors had no control over the conduct of physicians, pharmacies, or
patients in their prescription, distribution, or use of opioids. While courts may
find this convincing, counties and municipalities likely have a strong argument
that the opioid distributors exercised sufficient control.
Although the Third Circuit declined to hold gun manufacturers liable
because the city was unable to show that there was a direct link in causation
between the gun manufacturers' conduct and the harm suffered, cities and
counties alleging control of opioid distributors may be able to establish sufficient
control. Cities and counties may argue that because federal law and state law
require opioid distributors to report suspicious orders of opioids this constitutes
sufficient control. The causal chain is more direct in the opioid cases because the
opioid distributors retain the ultimate power to distribute opioids. If an opioid
distributor received a suspicious order, the distributor should then have reported
the suspicious order. By law, opioid and other drug distributors are required to
report any pharmaceutical orders that are unusually large, deviate from normal

216

See generally Kelly K. Dineen & James M. DuBois, Between a Rock and a Hard Place:

Can Physicians Prescribe Opioids to Treat Pain Adequately While Avoiding Legal Sanction, 42
AM. J. L. & MED. 7, 8 (2016).

See id. at 11.
See id.
219
See supra Section III.A.3.i.
220
See Camden Cty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 273 F.3d 536, 541 (3d
Cir. 2001).
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patterns, or are unusual in frequency. 1 Once these orders are reported, law
enforcement officials may investigate and take action;22 2 however, opioid
distributors failed to report suspicious orders to the West Virginia
4
Pharmaceutical Board. 3 Instead, the distributors held these reports for years.
Plaintiffs may use these facts to indicate that, but for the distributors
conduct, excessive amounts of opioids would not have been available to patients
and would not have resulted in the use of opioids for nonmedical purposes.
Courts should carefully scrutinize this argument and consider the actions of third
parties, including patients, physicians, pharmacies, and state medical boards.
Because the ultimate decision to distribute opioids belongs to the opioid
distributors, there is a direct link between the opioid distributors and the
excessive flow of opioids into counties and cities. The opioid distributors further
had means to prevent the excessive pumping of opioids into counties and cities
because they could have reported the orders and not filled those that were
suspicious if they so chose; however, the complaint by McDowell and Cabell
Counties alleges that opioid distributors conduct caused an illicit market for the
use of opioids.2 5 Nevertheless, their conduct alone is not likely the sole cause of
an illicit market and must be considered with the actions of patients, physicians;
pharmacies, and state pharmaceutical boards.
C. Damages Incurredby Local Governments are too Remote Because
Damages Could Have OccurredAbsent the Conduct of Opioid
Distributors
If the conduct of opioid distributors is not the cause in fact and the legal
cause of the damages incurred by local governments, then opioid distributors
should not be held liable for creating a public nuisance. If local governments
cannot show that opioid distributors' conduct was the factual cause and legal
cause of the opioid epidemic, the damages that the local governments have
incurred will be deemed too remote.
The standard before plaintiffs in public nuisance cases is difficult,
especially where products like opioids, guns, and tobacco are at issue. Plaintiffs
who are suing opioid distributors must prove that the damages they have suffered
22 6
If
would not have occurred absent the conduct of the opioid distributors.

221

See Eric Eyre, 'Suspicious' Drug Order Rules Never Enforced by State, CHARLESTON
Enforced],
Never
Rules
Drug
[hereinafter
2016)
18,
(Dec.

GAZETTE-MAIL

https://www.wvgazettemail.com/news/health/suspicious-drug-order-rules-never-enforced-bystate/article_3c9fl 983-9044-5e97-87ff-df5ed5e55418.html.
222

Id.

223

See id.

224

Id.
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Complaint, supra note 164, at 25; Amended Complaint, supra note 164, at 3.
See supra Section III.A.3.ii.
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plaintiffs can show this, then they have proven that there is reasonable certainty
that the damages occurred from the opioid distributors' conduct, and cause-infact is established. This becomes more difficult in the cases of opioid distributors.
The claims against opioid distributors do not focus on their conduct alone. Some
also scrutinize the conduct of the West Virginia State Board of Pharmacy as
partially responsible for bringing about the opioid epidemic. 2 27 Further, the
opioid distributors will likely attest that physicians, pharmacies, and even
patients are also responsible for the creation of the opioid epidemic and resulting
damages. Other courts have modified the standard where the conduct of multiple
parties is involved. A court will only hold opioid distributors responsible if the
local governments and other plaintiffs can show that the conduct of the opioid
distributors was a material element and substantial factor in bringing about the
injuries suffered by local governments.22 8
If the court finds that the opioid distributors' failure to report and refuse
suspicious orders of opioids to the West Virginia Board of Pharmacy constitutes
a material element and substantial factor in bringing about the opioid epidemic,
then the court must then examine whether the conduct is also the legal cause of
the damages. Only damages that are reasonably foreseeable as a result of the
conduct will constitute legal cause; however, this foreseeability is diminished
when the actions of third parties obscure the chain of causation. Even the Fourth
Circuit has acknowledged the complexity and occlusion of the chain of causation
in opioid cases. 229 West Virginia courts and other courts will need to closely
examine the conduct of potential parties involved in the production, distribution,
prescription, and use of opioids.
Here, the courts must ultimately determine whether opioid distributors'
failure to refuse and report suspicious orders of opioids from West Virginia
pharmacies constitutes the cause in fact and legal cause of the damages suffered
by Cabell County, McDowell County, and other local governments. While it is
plausible that a court may fmd that the damages of the local governments would
not have occurred absent the opioid distributors conduct and that those damages
were reasonably foreseeable, the chain of causation is likely too indirect to hold
opioid distributors liable for creating a public nuisance. The conduct of
physicians who were likely over-prescribing in some cases will likely be used to
refute liability. Further, the opioid distributors will also introduce evidence that
both physicians and patients were abusing opioids through excessive prescribing
and intake. Some patients may have been seeking opioids, not to use them, but
to sell those opioids to other persons who were abusing opioids.

227

See Eric Eyre, WV Board of Pharmacy Dismisses Director, CHARLESTON GAZETTE-MAIL

(July 18, 2017), https://www.wvgazettemail.com/news/health/wv-board-of-pharmacy-dismissesdirector/article d854ed6b-9e54-500c-be8d-542be617c7cf.html.
228
See supra Section M.A.3.ii.
229

See Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. v. J-M Smith Corp., 602 F. App'x 115, 116 (4th Cir. 2015).
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Drug companies might also contend that physicians have access to
patient records and history, and they ultimately decide whether or not to prescribe
opioids to patients. Pharmacies may also have played a role in the excessive
distribution of opioids. Pharmacists not only play a role in the distribution of
opioids but also provide educational information on the drugs that they are
providing. 230 An opioid distributor may blame pharmacies for opioid abuse by
arguing that pharmacies play a fundamental role in attending to patients and
detecting potential signs of opioid misuse.23 The fact that multiple parties are
involved in the distribution, prescription, and usage of opioids, any one of which
could have caused the opioid epidemic, will likely make the opioid distributors'
conduct too remote. Further, if West Virginia courts follow the reasoning of the
Illinois Supreme Court, the West Virginia courts should not hold opioid
distributors liable on the basis of public nuisance because the criminal acts of
third parties likely caused damages to local governments and contributed to the
opioid epidemic. All of these factors obscure the chain of causation and make it
difficult to hold that the conduct of opioid distributors is the factual and legal
cause of the opioid epidemic. Although local governments need resources to
address damages incurred as a result of the opioid epidemic, public nuisance suits
are not the answer.

V.

PUBLIC NUISANCE SUITS-A NARROW REMEDY TO A BROAD
PROBLEM

Public nuisance suits are an inadequate tool for local governments in
seeking redress for the damages they have incurred as a result of the opioid
epidemic. Local governments are at a loss for ways to repair their broken
systems. Providing treatment to those who are addicted to opioids and reducing
the use of opioids by residents will require expenditures of capital that local
governments may not have. Public nuisance suits are not simply a remedy for
local governments but a cry for help. Local governments need assistance, but a
lump sum of cash with no accountability measures to encourage responsible
spending will not ensure adequate redress of economic harms. A uniform
approach to the opioid epidemic is needed. Therefore, legislatures should place
tougher restrictions on opioid distributors and enact legislation to help relieve the
economic hardships suffered by local governments. Section A explains that
courts should refrain from expanding the doctrine of public nuisance because the
expansion would exceed the purpose of the law. To better combat the opioid
epidemic, Section B recommends that legislatures seek to resolve the opioid

See Victoria Reynolds et al., The Role of Pharmacists in the Opioid Epidemic: An
230
Examination of Pharmacist-FocusedInitiatives Across the United States and North Carolina,78

N.C. MED. J. 202, 203 (2017).
231

Id.
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epidemic by capitalizing on existing regulatory measures and enacting targeted
legislation.
A.

Courts Should Refrain from Engaging in Creatingan Unprecedented
Expansion of Public Nuisance Law

In addressing the claims of public nuisance against product
manufacturers, courts have declined to hold manufacturers liable.232 The courts
have determined that the claims put forth by plaintiffs against product
manufactures do not constitute public nuisance and have declined to expand the
common law doctrine. State courts have declined to expand public nuisance
liability because an expansion of the doctrine would exceed the original purpose
surrounding the doctrine.2 33 For example, when lead paint posed a detrimental
health risk to children, the Rhode Island Supreme Court declined to expand
public nuisance law.2 34 Instead, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the
term "public right" had not traditionally been interpreted to include the right to a
certain standard of living or medical care but had more generally been confined
to the access of a public good.235 Because previous courts have declined to
expand the common law doctrine of public nuisance, West Virginia courts and
other courts deciding public nuisance cases against opioid distributors should
defer to the legislature in expanding public nuisance law.
Legislators could propose amendments to the existing public nuisance
laws to specifically permit counties to recover damages from opioid distributors
if they engage in negligent practices; however, this is likely not the best option.
Public nuisance has served a specific purpose since it was enacted. 236 Expanding
the law could make "public interests" a basis for filing complaints against
product distributors and manufacturers when products cause an adverse effect on

232
See City of Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 277 F.3d 415,421 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding
that claims against gun manufacturers by the city did not constitute public nuisance, and there is
no guarantee that states will expand the doctrine of public nuisance); Tioga Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 15
v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 984 F.2d 915, 921 (8th Cir. 1993) (declining to expand public nuisance law

to hold plaster manufacturers liable because such an expansion would create a "monster that would

devour in one gulp the entire law of tort"); State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 951 A.2d 428, 453 (R.I.
2008) (explaining that "expanding the definition of public right based on the allegations in the

complaint would be antithetical to the common law and
widespread expansion of public nuisance law that never was intended").
233

would

lead to

a

See City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099, 1126 (Ill. 2004) ("The

negative consequence of judicially imposing a duty upon commercial enterprises to guard against
the criminal misuse of their products by others will be an unprecedented expansion of the law
of public nuisance.").
235

Lead Indus. Ass 'n, 951 A.2d at 453.
Id.

236 .

See Gifford, supra note 68, at 817-18 (discussing purposes of public nuisance law and

234

traditional public rights).
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public health and safety. In examining these adverse effects, courts have
repeatedly declined to hold car, tobacco, gun, and paint manufacturers liable for
237
producing products that cause adverse effects on public health.
Expanding the doctrine of public nuisance could subject more
manufacturers to lawsuits and unnecessary litigation when laws are already in
place to impose liability for defective design, manufacturing defect, and
marketing defects. 238 These and other tort theories are already in place to protect
consumers while maintaining business and economic interests.2 39 Further,
allowing local governments to collect damages to abate the opioid epidemic
poses many challenging problems. First, determining how to measure and award
damages based on the opioid epidemic is problematic because the injuries are
expansive and at times abstract. If courts were able to award significant damages
to abate the opioid epidemic, the local governments may not have the capabilities
to ensure that this money is actually used in a meaningful manner to reduce
opioid addiction. If the responsible spending of money to fund programs is a goal
of state government, this would be best accomplished through government
programs that require compliance and oversight. Lastly, expanding public
nuisance law could make it even more difficult to determine where to draw the
line in holding product manufacturers and distributors liable if their products
merely affect public health. If legislators wish to hold opioid distributors more
accountable for their conduct, they have greater tools at their disposal than
expanding the doctrine of public nuisance.
B. Legislators Should Seek to Redress the DamagesIncurred by Local
Governments Through TargetedLegislation and Regulatory Action
If legislatures wish to make opioid distributors more accountable for
distribution practices, legislatures should enact regulations that place tougher
restrictions on opioid distributors. West Virginia representatives have announced
that they intend to introduce legislation that seeks to eliminate the amount of
opioids available to patients.2 40 The new laws would reinforce good prescription
41 In order to curb
practices to physicians that may be over-prescribing opioids
the amount of opioids that are being prescribed, lawmakers in West Virginia are
seeking to limit opioid prescriptions to include pills only for a seven-day

See Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 77, at 552-62.
See id. at 578-81.
238
See id.
239
See Eric Eyre, WV Lawmakers Seek to Limit Opioid Prescribing,CHARLESTON GAZETTE240
Opioid Prescribing],
Lawmakers Limit
[hereinafter
2018)
8,
(Jan.
MAIL
https://www.wvgazettemail.com/news/health/wv -drugabuse/wv-lawmakers-seek-to-limitopioid-prescribing/article 1b088ea7-de2c-55c8-98de-a293bece5 1f4.html.
See id.
241
237
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supply; 242 however, this action may not go far enough. Opioid distributors have
already turned a blind eye to reporting laws within the state, which likely has
contributed to the opioid epidemic.24 3 If the new legislation is introduced and
passed, this would be a first step in the regulation of opioids within the state.
However, given the disparaging impacts of opioids in West Virginia, the state
cannot afford to be a follower and should consider setting an example to those
states affected by the opioid epidemic.
Governments throughout the country should also seek to place more
accountability on physicians and pharmacists by mandating that they utilize
Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs ("PDMPs"). 2' Almost all states
currently have a PDMP and some states mandate that health care providers utilize
the PDMP when prescribing and filling controlled substances.2 45 Not only are
PDMPs useful within the state but health care providers may also gain access to
PDMPs of other states.2 46 PDMPs are administered by varying administrative
bodies within each state.247 The utilization of PDMPs can serve as a useful tool
in monitoring prescriptions of opioids and whether patients have filled their
prescriptions. 24' This could ultimately reduce doctor shopping and excessive
distribution of opioids that local governments claim facilitate an illicit market.
Although this system is likely not an answer in itself to the opioid epidemic,
governments should mandate that health care providers utilize PDMPs in order
to encourage quality prescribing practices and reduce excessive distributions of
opioids. Because administrative agencies operate PDMPs, legislatures should
formulate laws focused on bolstering the state's administrative framework and
regulatory functions.
West Virginia should utilize the administrative framework that it has set
forth through the creation of the West Virginia Board of Pharmacy, which has

242

Id.

243

See Drug Rules Never Enforced,supra note 221.

See What States Need to Know About PDMPs,CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/pdmp/states.html (last updated Oct. 3, 2017).
244
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Christine Vestal, States Require Doctors to Use PrescriptionDrug Monitoring Systems for

Patients,

WASH.

POST

(Jan.

15,

2018),

https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-

science/states-require-doctors-to-use-prescription-drug-monitoring-systems-forpatients/2018/01/12/c76807b8-f009-1 1e7-97bfbba379b8O9ab story.html?utmterm=.0929d33067f3; see also W. VA. CODE

ANN.

§ 16-5Y-50)

(West 2018) (mandating that physicians access the Controlled Substances Monitoring Program to
ensure that the patient is not seeking controlled substances from multiple locations).
246

NAT'L ALL. FOR MODEL STATE DRUG LAWS, INTERSTATE SHARING OF PRESCRIPTION

2 (2011), http://www.namsdl.org/library/2BA908DC-1372636C-DDOEDA3313 BE8CF8/.
247
Prescription Drug Monitoring Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ), PDM\P TTAC,
http://www.pdmpassist.org/content/prescription-drug-monitoring-frequently-asked-questions-faq
(last visited Oct. 14, 2018).
248
See What States Need to Know About PDMPs,supranote 244; Vestal, supranote 245.
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been vested with the ability to promulgate rules in furtherance of the laws that
the legislature set forth.249 The legislature has introduced legislation that would
25°
give the Board more authority in the regulation of prescription opioids.
Current legislation being proposed would give the Board authority to investigate
reports of suspicious orders of controlled substances at any point in the
distribution process. 21 This law would enable the Board to conduct an
investigation at manufacturing, distribution, and c6nsumption levels. 25 2 Further,
it would enable the Board to conduct hearings in deciding to revoke or suspend
a controlled substance registration. 3
This law, if enacted, could work alongside other proposed laws in
limiting the number of opioids permissible in prescriptions.254 West Virginia
should take a robust regulatory and administrative approach at the opioid
epidemic. This should not involve expanding the doctrine of public nuisance.
Instead, West Virginia should rely on existing federal laws, enhance state laws,
and utilize administrative frameworks to address misconduct among opioid
distributors, pharmacies, and physicians. West Virginia could (1) enact laws that
place mandatory reporting requirements on opioid distributors, pharmacies, and
physicians; (2) develop laws that limit the number of opioids available to
consumers; (3) give standing to local governments who have suffered the most
harm; and (4) bolster administrative capacity to ensure compliance. Legislatures
should also consider specifying a minimum amount of monetary damages that
may be imposed on opioid distributors for failing to report suspicious orders of
opioids. These legal mechanisms, when utilized together, will address many
facets of the opioid epidemic and encourage opioid distributors to comply with
reporting laws.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Although public nuisance law may be a viable claim in some contexts,
it is hardly applicable in the case of opioid distributors and their conduct relating
to the opioid epidemic. Some have characterized public nuisance as a promising
area of litigation; however, expanding public nuisance law causes more problems
than it solves. Adequate remedies already exist to hold product manufacturers
liable for manufacturing defects and defective design. Yet, local governments
are attempting to utilize public nuisance law to obtain large amounts of damages
that would help remedy hardships that have resulted from opioid addiction.

253

§ 30-5-6 (West 2018).
See H.D. 4372, 83rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2018).
See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 30-5-6.
Id. § 30-5-6(u).
Id. § 30-5-6(v).
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See Lawmakers Limit OpioidPrescribing,supra note 240.
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Granting large sums of money to local governments to spend in whatever way
they believe will solve the opioid epidemic is a risky practice. Instead, local
governments throughout the country should seek help from state governments
because the suits alleged thus far do not constitute a valid claim for public
nuisance.
The suits filed by local governments misconstrue the traditional tort by
claiming that governments are entitled to recourse when a product affects the
public health. Further, the causal chain between the conduct of opioid distributors
is fragmented and obscured due to the actions of third parties involved in the
distribution of opioids. Courts should refrain from expanding public nuisance
law into areas for which the tort was never intended and allow the legislature to
take appropriate action. Legislatures are better equipped to handle this problem
because they can enact programs that will ensure responsible spending of
resources. Further, the legislature can enact targeted legislation, strengthen
regulatory frameworks, and mandate the utilization of Prescription Drug
Monitoring Programs to aid in the regulation of opioid distributors. Local
governments should look to their legislatures for help because public nuisance
provides mostly equitable remedies-rarely legal damages. The opioid epidemic
has damaged communities throughout the country and West Virginia. Due to the
damages that communities have'endured as a result of misconduct, opioid
distributors likely shoulder some blame. However, holding opioid distributors
liable for public nuisance would be an unprecedented expansion of the tort and
subject companies to liability when their products merely affect public health,
blurring the line of liability even more under public nuisance law.
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